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THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S USE OF FOREIGN 
PRECEDENT IN MATTERS OF RELIGION: WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOUR? 
C Rautenbach* 
1 Introduction 
For more than three hundred years the South African judiciary has, "with a minimum of 
fuss - and mostly without specific mention that they were doing so - adopted a 
comparative law approach" with regard to foreign precedent.1 The mixed nature (a mix 
of Roman-Dutch and English law) of South Africa's legal system necessitates a 
comparative legal approach to find, develop and make the law, and the South African 
courts were discreetly doing this behind the scenes, particularly since the unification of 
South Africa in the 1910s. They were consistently seeking guidance from foreign high 
court judgments, especially in the Commonwealth countries, the USA, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and other parts of Western Europe where the reception of Roman law also 
took place.2 
                                        
*  Christa Rautenbach. BIuris (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM LLD (PU for CHE). Professor of Law, 
Faculty of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. Email: 
christa.rautenbach@nwu.ac.za. This article is based on empirical research the author did within the 
context of an international project titled "Cross-Judicial Fertilization: The Use of Foreign Precedents 
by Constitutional Judges" headed by Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (see http://www.iacl-
aidc.org/en/blog/13-english-
categories/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=162&Itemid=201). The empirical data 
(1994-2011) collected by the author is documented at http://www4-win2.p.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-
wpd/textbases/ccj.htm, and is accessible to scholars. The data after 2011 have not been indexed yet. 
However, this should not have any influence on this analysis of the statistics, since the Court has not 
dealt with any religion cases since 2011. The methodology employed in the collection of the data is 
available at http://library.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-wpd/textbases/ccj_more.htm#methodology. To date, some 
of the results have been used in Rautenbach "South Africa: Teaching an 'Old Dog' New Tricks? An 
Empirical Study of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the South African Constitutional Court (1995–
2010)" in Groppi and Ponthoreau (eds) The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart 
Oxford 2013) 185-209 and Rautenbach and Du Plessis "In the Name of Comparative Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: The Consideration of German Precedents by South African Constitutional Court Judges" 
2013 German LJ 1539-1578 at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/. The first part of this contribution 
draws heavily on these results and publications. The author presented an adapted version of this 
contribution at the Symposium on Constitutionalism, Religious Freedom and Human Rights: 
Constitutional Migration and Transjudicialism beyond the North Atlantic held in Hannover, Germany, 
on 3-6 June 2015. The financial support of the National Research Foundation of South Africa and the 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation of Germany is acknowledged with appreciation. The opinions 
expressed and errors, however, are those of the author. I am also indebted to the anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful comments. 
1  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 500. 
2  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 500. 
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South Africa's re-entry into the global community after the abolition of its notorious 
Apartheid laws and the birth of a new democratic political dispensation in 1994, coupled 
with the judiciary's continued willingness to engage themselves in global judicial 
debates,3 remains a prominent feature of constitutional adjudication in South Africa. It is 
trite that South Africa's two consecutive constitutions4 have introduced a new 
constitutional dispensation based on the supremacy of the Constitution,5 the rule of law6 
and a Bill of Rights. It is believed, ostensibly without foundation, that the most important 
catalyst for judicial comparativism in South Africa today is the (almost) unique 
interpretation clause in the Constitution (section 39(1)), which stipulates:7 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum–  
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law.8 
This provision codifies the interpretation rules relevant for the interpretation of the South 
African Bill of Rights which was, at the commencement of the interim Constitution, a new 
development in South African law. 
The wording of subsections (b) and (c) suggests a difference in approach to international 
and foreign law. In the case of international law the court must consider it, and in the 
case of foreign law the courts may consider it. Though there is a clear difference between 
the two auxiliary verbs "may" and "must", both of them are linked with the verb 
"consider", which has a variety of meanings such as to "think carefully about 
(something)"; to "regard (someone or something) as having a specified quality"; to "take 
                                        
3  See Rautenbach "South Africa: Teaching an 'Old Dog' New Tricks?" 185-209. 
4  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution) was in operation 
from 27 April 1994 to 3 February 1997; and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the 
Constitution) has been in operation since 4 February 1997. 
5  See ss 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution.  
6  The rule of law is a founding value of the Constitution, see s 1(b). 
7  Section 11(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1997 contains a similar provision. It reads: 
"In interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law shall - (a) promote the values which 
underlie an open and democratic society; (b) take full account of the provisions of Chapter III and 
Chapter IV; and (c) where applicable, have regard to current norms of public international law and 
comparable foreign case law." 
8  Emphasis added. Also see the discussion of Dugard 1997 EJIL 85 with regard to the role of 
international law in the interpretation of the Constitution. 
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something into account when making a judgement"; and to "look attentively at".9 As will 
be illustrated, these types of actions are all employed by the Constitutional Court in one 
way or another during its reasoning process. 
In the case of international law, the courts are obliged to go through (ie "must consider") 
this considering process, whilst in the case of foreign law there is no such obligation (ie 
"may consider").10 In other words, the courts have the discretion to consider foreign law 
in terms of section 39(1)(c), but an obligation to consider international law in terms of 
section 39(1)(b). In addition, international law may include binding and non-binding 
law.11 Both forms may be used in the interpretation process.12 There is no similar 
distinction in respect of foreign law and the statutory permission to consider foreign law 
during the interpretation process authorises courts only to "'have regard to' such law"; 
there is "no injunction to do more than this".13 Thus, foreign law, in the domestic context, 
can never have more than persuasive force, while some international law may well be as 
binding on or prescriptive to domestic law.14 This sets international and foreign law apart, 
and this distinction has to be reckoned with in constitutional interpretation, and as a 
matter of fact in the interpretation and application of all law.15 
Although section 39(1)(c) has seeped into South Africa's constitutional jurisprudence 
beyond the interpretation of the Bill of Rights,16 it has been regarded by some scholars 
                                        
9  See the definition of "consider" in the Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press 2015 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com). 
10  Also see S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 37 (the Makwanyane case).  
11  Binding international law will be international law ratified and acceded to in terms of s 231 of the 
interim Constitution, which is similar to s 231 in the final Constitution. Also see s 232 regarding the 
position of customary international law and s 233, which obliges courts to give preference to 
international law when alternative interpretation outcomes exist. 
12  Makwanyane case para 35. The court considered the implication of s 35(1) of the interim Constitution, 
which is almost identical to s 39(1) of the Constitution. For a general discussion of the Constitutional 
Court's use of international law, see De Wet 2005 Fordham Int'l LJ 1529-1565.  
13  In the Makwanyane case para 37. 
14  Section 11(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1997, which contains a similar provision. 
It reads: "In interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law shall - (a) promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society; (b) take full account of the provisions of 
Chapter III and Chapter IV; and (c) where applicable, have regard to current norms of public 
international law and comparable foreign case law." 
15  See for example the position of international law as set out in ss 231-233 of the Constitution, and also 
Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2013 German LJ 1553. 
16  Klug Constitution of South Africa 79-80. 
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as the main catalyst for judicial comparativism in South Africa.17 Ackermann points to this 
misconception and says: "I have not the slightest doubt that, because of the comparative 
law ethos in South Africa, the Court would have placed the same reliance on foreign law 
even had there been no such provision in the Constitutions."18 To prove his point he 
refers to the comment of Justice Chaskalson in S v Makwanyane (the Makwanyane 
case):19 
The international and foreign authorities are of value [to the judges] because they 
analyse arguments for and against the death sentence and show how courts of other 
jurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue. For that reason alone they require our 
attention. They may also have to be considered because of their relevance to s 35(1) of 
the Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the South African judiciary were comparing foreign law on 
an ongoing basis even before 1994, they did it with the necessary discretion and 
circumspect. As eloquently put by Chaskalson:20 
In dealing with comparative law we must bear in mind that we are required to construe 
the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the constitution 
of some foreign country, and that this has to be done with due regard to our legal 
system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language of our own 
Constitution. We can derive assistance from public international law and foreign case 
law, but we are in no way bound to follow it. 
Kriegler J also warned in Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape21 that "the use of 
foreign precedent requires circumspection and acknowledgment that transplants require 
careful management". 
The constitutional reasoning of the South African Constitutional Court counts among 
those systems still in - or just beyond - their infancy, but it has nevertheless, over the 
past two decades, earned itself high praise among both its peers and expert observers 
                                        
17  See Lollini 2007 Utrecht L Rev 60. 
18  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 500 points out: "I have not the slightest doubt that, because of the comparative 
law ethos in South Africa, the Court would have placed the same reliance on foreign law even had 
there been no such provision in the Constitutions." 
19  The Makwanyane case para 34. Emphasis added. S 35(1) of the interim Constitution is the counterpart 
of s 39(1) of the final Constitution. 
20  The Makwanyane case para 39. Emphasis added. 
21  Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 2 SA 38 (CC) para 26. The case dealt with the 
constitutionality of criminal proceedings where the accused had not been brought to trial within a 
reasonable time after having been charged.  
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worldwide.22 It has been commended for its ground-breaking and courageous judgments 
on numerous occasions.23 Since its establishment in 1994 until the end of 2011,24 the 
Court has handed down 437 judgments. More than half of these judgments (223 in total) 
have cited more than 3047 foreign cases.25 Although these cases deal with all matters of 
the law, especially human rights issues, the Court's use of foreign cases in the area of 
religion is noteworthy. During the 16-year period under investigation the Court cited 
foreign cases dealing with religion from various jurisdictions more than a 109 times – no 
small feat if one considers that those citations were made in only five judgments of the 
Constitutional Court.26 
Against this background, this contribution deliberates on the propensity of the South 
African Constitutional Court to look beyond its borders to deal with issues of religion. My 
observations are based on statistical results obtained in the period 1994 to 2011.27 The 
empirical survey follows both a quantitative and a qualitative approach by counting and 
evaluating explicit citations of foreign cases. The quantitative results deal with statistics 
such as the number of citations per judge, country and foreign case, and the qualitative 
approach makes use of formal and substantive factors to determine the actual or 
potential influence of foreign cases on issues of religion in South Africa. From the outset 
it should be made clear that the author does not criticise the Constitutional Court for its 
abundant use of foreign cases in its judicial reasoning. On the contrary, the results reveal 
that the Court uses foreign case law as "sources for specific lines of argument and 
justification and … for supporting the general role of the court and judicial review in 
particular".28 
                                        
22  Kende Constitutional Rights 33. 
23  O'Regan "From Form to Substance" 15. 
24  The results from 2012 are not available yet, but irrelevant for this discussion regardless. 
25  The results and methodology are available at http://www4-win2.p.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-
wpd/textbases/ccj.htm. See the information provided in the first footnote. 
26  S v Lawrence, S v Negal, S v Solberg 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) (the Lawrence case); Christian Education 
South Africa v Minister of Education 1999 2 SA 83 (CC); Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) (the Chrstian Education case); Prince v President, Cape Law Society 
2002 2 SA 794 (CC) (the Prince case); MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) 
(the Pillay case). 
27  As already explained, the author collected and captured the results in a database hosted on the 
website of the North-West University. The methodology followed in capturing the data is explained in 
detail at http://www4-win2.p.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-wpd/textbases/ccj.htm. 
28  These words were uttered by Klug Constitution of South Africa 79 as a comment on the Court's use 
of foreign law in the Makwanyane case. The overall statistics reveal that this is indeed what the court 
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2 Constitutional provisions protecting freedom of religion 
The aim of my contribution is not to discuss the content given to freedom of religion in 
South African law, but to comment on the propensity of the Constitutional Court to 
engage in foreign law in the context of religion. In order to do so, it is necessary to refer 
to the most important constitutional provisions dealing with religion. Most importantly, 
the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion is protected as an individual right in 
section 15, which provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion.  
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided 
that-  
(a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;  
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and  
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.  
(3) (a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising-  
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or 
family law; or  
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by 
persons professing a particular religion.  
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section 
   and the other provisions of the Constitution. 
The right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion is also protected as a group right in 
section 31(1), which stipulates: 
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the 
right, with other members of that community-  
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and  
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society. 
The relationship between these two provisions has been explained by Justice Ngcobo in 
Prince v President, Cape Law Society29 as follows: 
This Court has on two occasions considered the contents of the right to freedom of 
religion. On each occasion, it has accepted that the right to freedom of religion at least 
comprehends: (a) the right to entertain the religious beliefs that one chooses to 
                                        
has been doing on an ongoing basis even though the citation rate of foreign cases seems to be in 
decline. In 2011 (the last year of the empirical results), only 106 foreign citations were counted, whilst 
the amount was 645 in 1995. Results obtainable at http://www4-win2.p.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-
wpd/textbases/ccj.htm. 
29  The Prince case paras 38-39. The case is discussed at 3.3. 
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entertain; (b) the right to announce one's religious beliefs publicly and without fear of 
reprisal; and (c) the right to manifest such beliefs by worship and practice, teaching and 
dissemination. Implicit in the right to freedom of religion is the "absence of coercion or 
restraint". Thus "freedom of religion may be impaired by measures that force people to 
act or refrain from acting in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs". 
Seen in this context, ss 15(1) and 31(1)(a) complement one another. Section 31(1)(a) 
emphasises and protects the associational nature of cultural, religious and language 
rights. In the context of religion, it emphasises the protection to be given to members of 
communities united by religion to practise their religion. 
Other provisions, such as the right to equality (section 9), the right to freedom of 
expression (section 16), the right to freedom of assembly (section 17) and the right to 
freedom of association (section 18) are all relevant in the context of religion but will not 
be discussed here. 
3 Judicial engagement with foreign religion cases: making sense of 
statistics 
3.1 S v Lawrence, S v Negal, S v Solberg 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) (the Lawrence 
case) 
The first judgment of the Constitutional Court that dealt with religious issues was the 
Lawrence case. The three cases were dealt with as one, because they were concerned 
with a contravention of the Liquor Act by three employees of what used to be known as 
the Seven Eleven stores. The three appellants were employees who had been convicted 
in separate cases in the Magistrate's court. The appeal case was concerned with, amongst 
other issues, the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Liquor Act,30 especially those 
preventing the selling of liquor after hours,31 at a particular place32 or on closed days.33 
One of the contentions was that the prohibition imposed on the selling of wine on closed 
days (Sundays, Good Friday and Christmas Day) is inconsistent with the constitutional 
                                        
30  Liquor Act 27 of 1989. The case was decided when the interim Constitution was still in operation. 
31  Section 90(1)(a) of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989 allows for the sale of liquor on weekdays between 09:00 
and 20:00. 
32  Section 88(1) of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989 prohibits the sale under a grocer's wine licence of any 
liquor other than table wine. 
33  Section 90(1)(b) read with s 2 of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989 prohibits the sale of liquor on Sundays, 
Good Friday and Christmas Day. 
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right to freedom of religion, particularly the free exercise of religion.34 One of the 
appellants contended that: 
... the purpose of prohibiting wine selling by grocers on "closed day(s)" was "to induce 
submission to a sectarian Christian conception of the proper observance of the Christian 
Sabbath and Christian holidays or, perhaps, to compel the observance of the Christian 
Sabbath and Christian holidays". This, so the argument went, "coerced individuals to 
affirm or acquiesce in a specific practice solely for a sectarian Christian purpose", and 
was inconsistent with the freedom of religion of those persons who do not hold such 
beliefs and do not wish to adhere to them.35 
The majority held that the connection between the Christian religion and the restriction 
against grocers selling wine on Sundays was too tenuous to be characterised as an 
infringement of religious freedom, because Sundays in South Africa have required a 
secular as well as a religious character.36 The judgment was delivered when the interim 
Constitution was still in operation. Section 35(1) allowed the Court to "have regard to 
comparable foreign case law" in interpreting the provisions of the Bill of the Rights.37 
Three of the nine presiding judges cited 21 cases from four countries at least 57 times 
(Canada,38 USA,39 UK40 and India41) in the course of their reasoning.42 
Justice Chaskalson, who delivered the majority judgment, cited foreign cases 23 times. 
He did so in the absence of any hint from the text of the judgment that he was doing 
                                        
34  Interim Constitution s 14: "Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion, which shall include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning." 
35  Lawrence case para 85. 
36  Lawrence case paras 84-105. At para 96 the court explained: "Amongst those who observe Sundays 
as rest days, are many who do so because it has become the most convenient day for such purpose, 
and not because of any wish to observe the Christian Sabbath. The secular nature of Sundays is 
evidenced by the ways in which many people spend their Sundays, engaging in sport and recreation 
rather than in worship." 
37  Section 35(1) of the interim Constitution was the counterpart of s 39(1) of the Constitution and 
provided as follows: "In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched 
in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law." Emphasis added. 
38  Six cases which were cited 22 times. 
39  Seventeen cases which were cited 31 times. 
40  One case cited only once. 
41  Three cases which were cited 3 times. 
42  Chaskalson P delivered the majority judgment and cited foreign cases 23 times, Sachs J delivered a 
concurring but separate judgment and cited foreign cases 22 times and O'Regan J, who delivered a 
dissenting judgment, cited foreign cases 12 times. 
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anything more than compare,43 distinguish44 or approve45 foreign case law. Particularly 
significant is how Chaskalson embraced the content given to freedom of religion by the 
Canadian case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (the Drug Mart case), viz.:46 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious 
beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without 
fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief by worship and practice 
or by teaching and dissemination. 
According to Chaskalson he could not "offer a better definition than this of the main 
attributes of freedom of religion".47 Since its approval by Chaskalson, the Canadian 
definition of freedom of religion has been accepted on a few other occasions by the 
Constitutional Court, and it would be safe to conclude that the contribution of the 
Canadian case in providing a workable definition for religion seems to be a given.48 The 
purposive (teleological) approach followed by the Constitutional Court to determine the 
meaning of freedom of religion is also a transplantation from the Canadian court in the 
Drug Mart case based on the following passage:49 
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by 
an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, 
in the light of the interests it was meant to protect. In my view this analysis is to be 
undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by 
reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language 
chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts 
enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights 
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation 
should be, as the judgment in Southam emphasizes, a generous rather than a legalistic 
one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full 
benefit of the Charter's protection. 
                                        
43  For example, he compares the approach of the United States Supreme Court with that of a legal 
academic and comes to the conclusion that "[t]his accords with" its approach. The Lawrence case 
para 43. 
44  For example, he distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which declared provisions 
of the Canadian Lord's Day Act, 1970 (RSC) unconstitutional, from the provisions of the Liquor Act 27 
of 1989, which prevents the selling of liquor on Sundays. The Lawrence case para 87. 
45  For example, he referred with approval to the content of freedom of religion as set out in the Canadian 
case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295 (hereafter the Drug Mart case). 
46  Lawrence case para 92. The Drug Mart case in turn also engaged in comparative descriptions of 
freedom of religion, such as the one given in the case of Board of Education v Barnette 319 US 624 
(1943) 653. 
47  Lawrence case para 92. 
48  Christian Education case para 18; Prince case para 38. 
49  Drug Mart case 344. Cited with approval in the Makwanyane case para 19. 
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This reception of Canadian concepts into South African law has been made possible by 
the accommodating attitude of the South African constitutional judges which, in turn, has 
a trickle effect overall as a result of the principle of stare decisis followed by the South 
African judiciary.50 The influence of the Drug Mart case in the judgments of the 
Constitutional Court has been quite profound. From 1995-2011 it has been cited at least 
31 times in the Constitutional Court in cases dealing with a variety of issues.51 Besides 
providing the South African judiciary with a definition of the attributes of freedom of 
religion and a purposive approach to constitutional interpretation, its reasoning re the 
principle of proportionality in the context of the limitation of rights was also adopted and 
developed to fit South African needs.52 
Justice Sachs, who delivered a separate judgment, cited foreign cases 22 times. He was 
the only judge that cautioned against the unqualified use of foreign jurisprudence to 
solve cases, but nonetheless recognised the necessity to look elsewhere for guidance to 
develop legal doctrines in South Africa:53 
Our solutions to all these problems and difficulties will, of course, be found not in the 
complex and often contradictory North American jurisprudence on the subject but in the 
text and context of our own Constitution. In Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another this 
Court cautioned against simplistic transplantation into our jurisprudence of formulae, 
modes of classification and legal doctrine developed in other countries where the 
constitutional texts and socio-historical situations were different from ours. At the same 
time we stated that in developing doctrine we had to take account both of our specific 
situation and of problems which we shared with all humanity. … If I draw on statements 
by certain United States Supreme Court Justices, I do so not because I treat their 
decisions as precedents to be applied in our Courts, but because their dicta articulate in 
an elegant and helpful manner problems which face any modern court dealing with what 
has loosely been called church/State relations. Thus, though drawn from another legal 
culture, they express values and dilemmas in a way which I find most helpful in 
elucidating the meaning of our own constitutional text. 
                                        
50  In accordance with this rule, a South African court is bound to former precedents when the same 
points arise again in litigation. See Du Bois "Part 1: General" 76-92 for a detailed discussion. 
51  See Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) – 6 citations; the Makwanyane case – 
2 citations; S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) – 1 citation; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 
2 SACR 761 (CC) - 1 citation; the Lawrence case – 12 citations; Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) – 1 citation; President of the Republic of South Africa 1997 4 SA 
1 (CC) – 1 citation; Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) – 1 
citation; Prince case - 1 citation; S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) – 3 citations; Zondi v MEC for 
Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) – 1 citation; Department of Land Affairs 
v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) – 1 citation. 
52  See the Makwanyane case para 105 (proportionality) and para 325 (purposive approach). 
53  The Lawrence case para 141. Footnotes omitted. 
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According to Sachs, foreign cases could not be treated as precedent, although they did 
illuminate the text of the South African Constitution, which was at the time of the 
judgment still experiencing growing pains. 
In general, the minority judgments of South African judges rarely have persuasive value 
in other South African courts, but the same attitude apparently does not to apply to 
foreign case law. Sachs, for example, referred with approval to the dissenting judgment 
of Stewart J of the US Supreme Court in Braunfeld v Brown54 to illustrate the effect that 
statutory limits on trading on Sundays might have on non-Christian traders. In the 
Braunfeld case the position of Orthodox Jews was a case in point. Their religion obliged 
them to cease trading on Saturdays in addition to the statutory limit on trading on 
Sundays. According to Sachs there were two ways in which the determination of Sundays 
as closed days might involve the infringement of someone's freedom of religion. The first 
one, as described in the dissenting judgment in the Braunfeld case, involved the impact 
closed Sundays have on non-Christian liquor sellers who are also prevented by their 
religion from selling on any other day. The second had to do with the "negative radiating 
symbolic effect that state endorsement of the Christian Sabbath might have".55 Although 
Sachs referred to the dissenting judgment in the Braunfeld case, he gave no indication 
of whether it had had a sincere impact on his reasoning or whether he had merely 
referred to it in passing. 
The third judge, who cited 12 foreign cases, was Justice O'Regan.56 She delivered a 
dissenting judgement and was of the opinion that Sundays as reflected in the Liquor Act 
were days of Christian significance and that therefore the relevant provisions did not pass 
constitutional muster. She also compared foreign case law in the absence of any hints as 
to what the influence of those cases on her judgment was, This is therefore another 
illustration of the fact that comparative judicialism is part and parcel of the South African 
judiciary's paraphernalia without them having to justify themselves for referencing it. 
                                        
54  Braunfeld v Brown 366 US 599 (1961) 616. See the Lawrence case para 137. 
55  In terms of s 14 of the interim Constitution. See the Lawrence case paras 137-138 and also the USA 
case referred to in fn 100 of the judgment. 
56  See the Lawrence case from para 109 onwards. 
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3.2 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 
(CC) (the Christian Education case) 
Whereas the Lawrence case was decided in the context of the interim Constitution, the 
Christian Education case dealt with religion in the context of the final Constitution. In this 
case the appellant, a voluntary association consisting of a group of concerned parents, 
approached the courts to strike down a provision of the Schools Act57 which prohibits 
corporal punishment in any public or private school. The facts of the case first came 
before the Constitutional Court in an application for direct access to challenge the validity 
of the relevant provision in the Schools Act, but the application was regarded as 
premature and dismissed by Justice Langa.58 After the case had taken its course in the 
High Court it came before the Constitutional Court again in the form of an appeal. 
The central question before Justice Sachs, who delivered the majority decision in the 
Constitutional Court, was whether or not the provision in the Schools Act that prevented 
corporal punishment infringed the religious rights59 of parents with children in private 
Christian schools who believed that corporal punishment was in line with their religious 
convictions and a necessary requirement in the upbringing of children. In support of their 
contention that corporal punishment be allowed and was the responsibility of Christian 
parents, various verses from the Bible were put forward as justification.60 
Cases which involve children's rights are undeniably hard to adjudicate, especially where 
the likelihood of a tug-of-war between seemingly self-same rights and freedoms exist. 
Justice Sachs was well aware of this tension.61 In essence, he agreed that the provisions 
                                        
57  Schools Act 84 of 1996. The offending provision, s 10 reads: "(1) No person may administer corporal 
punishment at a school to a learner. (2) Any person who contravenes ss (1) is guilty of an offence 
and liable on conviction to a sentence which could be imposed for assault." 
58  Langa DP cited 8 foreign judgments in the course of his reasoning but none of them had to do with 
religion. 
59  In terms of the Constitution, these rights include the rights in ss 15 and 31. 
60  See Christian Education case para 4: "Proverbs 22:6 Train up a child in the way it should go and when 
he is old he will not depart from it. Proverbs 22:15 Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child, but 
the rod of correction shall drive it far from him. Proverbs 19:18 Chasten thy son while there is hope 
and let not thy soul spare for his crying. Proverbs 23:13 and 14 Do not withhold discipline from a 
child, if you punish with a rod he B will not die. Punish him with a rod and save his soul from death." 
61  The Christian Education case paras 13-15. One the one hand, parents have the right to direct the 
education of their children in accordance with their religious beliefs but, on the other hand, it is in the 
best interest of children not to be subjected to degrading corporal punishment. 
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of the Schools Act limited the religious rights of parents, but found nonetheless that they 
imposed an acceptable limitation62 on the parents' exercise of their religious beliefs, and 
dismissed the appeal. 
In the course of his reasoning Justice Sachs cited foreign cases 18 times. He referred to 
the definition of freedom of religion as given in the Drug Mart case - cited with approval 
in the Lawrence case - apparently conceding, without much ado, that it had already been 
received into South African religious jurisprudence.63 With regard to the question if the 
limitation the Schools Act placed on the religious rights of the parents could be justified, 
Justice Sachs referred to the controversy regarding the "strict scrutiny" test in the United 
States and cited with approval the viewpoint of Judge Scalia in the Supreme Court, who 
rejected this test in the context of freedom of religion.64 
Justice Sachs' citation of foreign case law is accompanied by formulations such as "courts 
throughout the world have shown"65 and "the trend in Europe and neighbouring 
countries",66 illustrating the long-established use of foreign law by the South African 
judiciary to use comparative materials as sources for judicial review, especially where its 
own jurisprudence is underdeveloped.67 
3.3 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) (the Prince 
case) 
The third case dealing with freedom of religion was the Prince case. The appellant had a 
law degree and had satisfied all the academic requirements to be admitted as an 
                                        
62  Constitution s 36(1) stipulates: "(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including- (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) 
the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose." 
63  The Christian Education case para 18. 
64  See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 (1990) 
referred to by Justice Sachs in the Christian Education case para 29, note 30. 
65  The Christian Education case para 41. 
66  The Christian Education case para 43. 
67  As explained by Smithey 2001 Comp Polit Stud 1188: "Judges confronted with new situations typically 
reason by analogy to extrapolate the appropriate course from existing principles of law, custom, and 
'social utility'. These forces allow the judge to fashion the law from workable principles that will be 
tested over time by their application to real controversies. The more novel the question faced, the 
more resourceful the judge will have to be." 
C RAUTENBACH  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1559 
attorney. The Law Society refused to register him as a candidate attorney, because he 
had two previous convictions for the possession of cannabis and also a declared an intent 
to continue using it for religious purposes as required by the Rastafarian religion. Prince 
put his legal education to good use, and he first approached the High Court to challenge 
the decision of the Law Society, but failed.68 Then he appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, where the appeal was dismissed,69 and finally he lodged an appeal with the 
Constitutional Court.70 The Constitutional Court delivered two judgments. The first 
judgment was an interim judgment71 to allow the litigants to adduce additional evidence, 
because - as explained by Justice Ngcobo, the right to freedom of religion in the "open 
and democratic society contemplated by the Constitution is important", and because the 
appellant belonged to a minority group72 
[t]he constitutional right asserted by the appellant goes beyond his own interest - it 
affects the Rastafari community. The Rastafari community is not a powerful one. It is a 
vulnerable group. It deserves the protection of the law precisely because it is a 
vulnerable minority. The very fact that Rastafari use cannabis exposes them to social 
stigmatisation. … Our Constitution recognises that minority groups may hold their own 
religious views and enjoins us to tolerate and protect such views. However, the right to 
freedom of religion is not absolute. While members of a religious community may not 
determine for themselves which laws they will obey and which they will not, the state 
should, where it is reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting the believers to a choice 
between their faith and respect for the law.73 
The Court in the second and final case was divided five to four against Prince.74 The ratio 
underlying the majority's decision was that the use of cannabis by Rastafari could not be 
sanctioned without impairing the state's ability to enforce its statutes in the public 
interest. The failure to make provision for an exemption to accommodate adherents of 
the Rastafari religion was thus a reasonable and justifiable limitation under the 
Constitution.75 
                                        
68  Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 1998 8 BCLR 976 (C). 
69  Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2000 3 SA 845 (SCA). 
70  Two judgments were delivered in the Constitutional Court, namely Prince v President, Cape Law 
Society 2001 2 SA 388 (CC) (the interim Prince case) and Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 
(2) SA 794 (CC) (the final Prince case). 
71  The interim Prince case.  
72  The interim Prince case para 25. 
73  The interim Prince case para 26. 
74  The final Prince case. 
75  The final Prince case para 139. 
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The record of the final Prince case contains 29 foreign case citations. The Drug Mart was 
mentioned once again for its definition of freedom of religion (and is by now firmly 
entrenched in South African law).76 A number of the foreign cases cited in the judgment 
of the majority had to do with Prince's contention that he accepted the fact that the 
legislation prohibiting the possession and use of cannabis served a legitimate government 
purpose, but that an exemption had to be made in favour of the use for religious 
purposes.77 The Court compared some of the approaches in the judgments of the US 
Supreme Court and distinguished them from the facts in casu.78 The tendency of the 
Court to use foreign case law to support its role as comparative jurists is illustrated in 
phrases such as ".... I do not believe that read as a whole his judgment is inconsistent 
with the granting of a narrowly tailored religious exemption in South Africa for the 
sacramental use by Rastafari of dagga …".79 
Comparing foreign cases is not the same as being bound to foreign precedents in 
accordance with the principle of stare decisis followed in South Africa. Thus, it is not 
extraordinary that some of the Constitutional Court judges have referred to, and 
occasionally followed, an approach of the minority of a foreign court. As suggested by 
the majority in the final Prince case:80 "… the approach of the minority of the Court in 
Smith's81 case is more consistent with the requirements of our Constitution and our 
jurisprudence on the limitation of rights than the approach of the majority", although, in 
the end, the Court also did not follow the approach of the minority but developed its own 
proportionality analysis in dealing with the limitation of rights. The Smith's case was 
                                        
76  The final Prince case para 38. 
77  The final Prince case paras 113-114. 
78  The final Prince case paras 119 and further. 
79  The final Prince case para 152 footnote 22. The Court referred to the judgment of Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 (1990), where the court 
evaluated the significance the "drug peyote has for native Americans". 
80  The final Prince case para 128. 
81  Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 (1990). The 
case concerned the criminal prohibition of a hallucinogenic drug Peyote for sacramental purposes at 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church. The majority held that the free exercise of religion 
does not relieve an individual from the obligation to comply with valid and neutral law, whilst the 
minority concluded that the First Amendment insofar as it applied to religion is not absolute and could 
be subordinated to a general governmental interest in the regulation of conduct, but "only if the 
government were able to justify that 'by a compelling State interest and by means narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest'." The final Prince case paras 121-122. 
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considered quite extensively by the Court and was cited at least 13 times82 because, as 
explained by the Court, it demonstrates "the difficulty confronting a litigant seeking to be 
exempted for religious reasons from the provisions of a criminal law of general 
application".83 
3.4 MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (the Pillay 
case) 
Although the Pillay case did not deal with freedom of religion per se, it dealt with the 
Hindu culture which, in this context, is broad enough to include religion, especially in the 
context of religious and cultural beliefs and practices in a school setting. In this case 
Sunali, a Hindu learner, was forbidden by her school to wear a nose stud because the 
wearing of jewellery was banned by the School's Code of Conduct. Sunali and her mother 
were not satisfied with the ban and initiated legal steps against the school, which 
commenced in the Equality Court84 and reached a conclusion in the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court found that a combination of the school's refusal to grant Sunali 
an exception to wear her nose stud and the provisions of the Code of Conduct, which did 
not provide for an exception to allow for a reasonable accommodation of religious or 
cultural beliefs, resulted in unfair discrimination.85 
The facts of the case were the first of a kind, and extensive reference to alternative 
approaches by foreign jurisdictions were made by the litigants. Justice Langa, who 
delivered the majority decision, emphasised the usefulness of foreign jurisprudence but 
cautioned against the dangers of careless judicial comparativism by emphasising that 
"the context in which a particular pronouncement was made needs to be carefully 
examined".86 In all, he cited foreign cases 19 times.87 Foreign case citations were used, 
inter alia, with the purpose of proving that "even there" a certain measure was adopted, 
                                        
82  The final Prince case paras 47, 119-123, 128, 129, 152, 155 and 163.  
83  The final Prince case para 129. 
84  The Pillay case para 10. 
85  The Pillay case para 119. 
86  The Pillay case para 49. 
87  Canada – 7 citations; European Court of Human Rights – 1 citation; Germany – 1 citation; UK – 2 
citations, the USA – 7 citations; and Zimbabwe – 1 citation. 
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which the court intended to adopt "even here".88 For example, in order to determine 
whether a practice or belief qualifies as religious, Justice Langa remarked that it is 
"accepted both in South Africa and abroad that in order to determine if a practice or 
belief qualifies as religious a court should ask only whether the claimant professes a 
sincere belief", thus performing a subjective enquiry.89 There was, however, no such 
consensus concerning culture, and arguments were raised that because culture is "an 
associative practice, a more objective approach should be adopted".90 The difference 
between the two approaches were not greatly important to Justice Langa - according to 
him it was difficult anyway to distinguish between Hindu religion and culture - and the 
conclusion was that Sunali "held a sincere belief that the nose stud was part of her 
religion and culture".91 
The usefulness of foreign jurisprudence in the absence of South African authority was 
also recognised by Justice Langa in dealing with the question of whether or not Sunali's 
wearing of the nose stud should be protected in terms of the Constitution and the Equality 
Act,92 when its practice was voluntary. To develop the jurisprudence re this question the 
use of foreign case law was thought to be valuable because, as acknowledged by Justice 
Langa, "[t]his question has not yet arisen before South African courts".93 The school 
argued that voluntary practices should not be protected or should receive less protection, 
while Sunali's legal team took the opposite stance.94 The question Justice Langa was 
grappling with was whether voluntary practices were "any less a part of a person's 
identity or whether they did "affect human dignity any less seriously" because they were 
not mandatory?95 In order to answer this question Justice Langa affirmed the 
Constitution's commitment to diversity. According to him, "[d]ifferentiating between 
mandatory and voluntary practices does not celebrate or affirm diversity … We cannot 
celebrate diversity by permitting it only when no other option remains".96 Thus, "whether 
                                        
88  Citations are used with the purpose of proving that a certain measure was adopted elsewhere as well. 
See the discussion of Rautenbach "South Africa: Teaching and 'Old Dog' New Tricks?" 207. 
89  The Pillay case para 52. Footnotes omitted and emphasis added. 
90  The Pillay case para 52. 
91  The Pillay case para 58. 
92  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
93  The Pillay case para 61. 
94  The Pillay case para 61. 
95  The Pillay case para 61. 
96  The Pillay case para 65. 
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a religious or cultural practice is voluntary or mandatory is irrelevant at the threshold 
stage of determining whether it qualifies for protection".97 It is significant that he refers 
to the shared values of other jurisdictions, such as Canada, where the Supreme Court 
has also affirmed the necessity of protecting voluntary religious practices.98 
Foreign cases were again considered when Justice Langa evaluated the application of the 
"reasonable accommodation" of diversity, a responsibility which rested firmly on the 
shoulders of South African society: "Our society which values dignity, equality, and 
freedom must therefore require people to act positively to accommodate diversity."99 His 
comparative approach to solving the problem of which steps needed to be taken to 
accommodate diversity is reflected in his words that the problem had been debated "both 
in this Court and abroad and different positions have been taken":100 
… although the term 'undue hardship' is employed as the test for reasonable 
accommodation in both the United States and Canada, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that employers need only incur 'a de minimis cost' in order to accommodate an 
individual's religion, whilst the Canadian Supreme Court has specifically declined to adopt 
that standard and has stressed that 'more than mere negligible effort is required to 
satisfy the duty to accommodate.' The latter approach is more in line with the spirit of 
our constitutional project which affirms diversity. However, the utility of either of these 
phrases is limited as ultimately the question will always be a contextual one dependant 
not on its compatibility with a judicially created slogan but with the values and principles 
underlying the Constitution. Reasonable accommodation is, in a sense, an exercise in 
proportionality that will depend intimately on the facts. 
The approach to foreign law employed by Justice Langa is in line with what Ackermann 
said about his own experiences:101 
Recourse to foreign law often helped me (at least) to identify the correct problem, or to 
identify it properly, and I am at a loss to see what danger can lurk herein. There are, 
after all, few human and societal problems that are not, in their essence, universal. It is 
also useful to see how foreign courts have solved the problem, what methodology has 
been used to this end, what the competing considerations have been, and whether any 
potential dangers were identified in the process. 
4 Conclusion 
                                        
97  The Pillay case para 67. 
98  The Pillay case para 65. 
99  The Pillay case para 75. 
100  The Pillay case paras 75-76. Footnotes and references omitted. 
101  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 508. 
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Whilst the rest of the world is debating the pros and cons of judicial comparativism,102 
the South African Constitutional Court has been developing, without much ado, an 
impressive reference list of foreign precedents, without fear or favour. This presentation 
has dealt with the propensity of the Constitutional Court to look beyond its borders in 
matters of religion, which we have seen has happened quite often in the few cases 
discussed. Never considering foreign precedents to be binding or persuasive, the Court 
has been protecting its independence. It does not share the fears of some that 
transjudicialism would endanger the sovereignty of courts. In the words of Ackermann:103 
One may be seeking information, guidance, stimulation, clarification, or even 
enlightenment, but never authority binding on one's own decision. One is doing no more 
than keeping the judicial mind open to new ideas, problems, arguments and solutions. 
And also: 
The fact that in a particular case, the caution which should accompany the use of foreign 
constitutional law104 is not explicitly repeated, does not warrant the inference that due 
care was not taken.105 
Transjudicialism, or comparative judicialism as I prefer to call it, enriches judicial 
reasoning and promises an escape from that which has been described by Ackermann as 
a "tunnel vision" towards judicial problem solving.106 A comparative approach enhances 
one's legal thinking, which may become unimaginative after a few years on the bench. 
To this end, Ackermann explains, and I fully agree:107 
One often ends up rehearsing the same line of reasoning or - in a type of inductive 
process - by trying to find additional authority for the provisional conclusions one has 
already reached. It is in this context that foreign law can play a particularly valuable 
role. It may be that, when one commences the enquiry into foreign law, one is 
(psychologically) hoping to find confirmation for one's hypotheses, but if one remains 
alive to falsifying possibilities, the foreign law can be of particular value. In any event, 
                                        
102  See, inter alia, Bryde 2005 Tul L Rev 203-219; Bahdi 2002 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 555-603; Buxbaum 
2004 Ind J Global Legal Studies 183-189; Tawfik 2007 Queen's Law J 573-601; Gray 2007 Stan L Rev 
1249-1280; Slaughter 1994 U Rich L Rev 99-137; Wood 2005 Duq L Rev 93-119; Black and Lee 2007 
Law and Social Inquiry 791-807; Markesini 2006 Tul L Rev 123-185; Lollini 2007 Utrecht L Rev 60-74; 
and Ackermann 2006 SALJ 497-515. See the collection of papers in Groppi and Ponthoreau Use of 
Foreign Precedents, and also Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2013 German LJ 1539-1578. 
103  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 507. 
104  Although Ackermann gives this explanation in the context of "comparative constitutional law", the 
same reasoning applies to comparative case law. 
105  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 506.  
106  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 508. 
107  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 509. Footnotes omitted. 
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foreign law may stimulate, in Einstein's words, "creative imagination" by "rais[ing] new 
questions, new possibilities … regard[ing] old problems from a new angle." 
It is evident that comparative jurisprudence in the area of freedom of religion has been 
important so far, particularly in the early stages of legal development. Though foreign 
law is not binding on South African courts, it can still contribute to shaping and developing 
South African law - constitutional and human rights law, in particular. Everything depends 
on the manner in which a court resorts to foreign law, and what it does with the 
information it gleans from such law. The importance of a properly developed comparative 
jurisprudence in this context can hardly be overstated. It is evident that the Constitutional 
Court is confident enough that its independence will not be tainted by its propensity to 
consider foreign jurisprudence. It is not looking at foreign cases because it is clueless 
about what to do, but because it is the right thing to do - it is transnational 
contextualisation in action! 
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